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JURISDICTION 
The case was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0). The case 
was then poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1) The first question posed by the appellee/cross-appellant for the Court of Appeals is 
whether it was an abuse of discretion for the trial Court to default Mr. Sykes for filing a list of 
witnesses that the trial court judged to be too long and to fail to grant a new trial when moved to do 
so. The appropriate standard here is abuse of discretion. The question here are listed out of order of 
the time of filing because if the Court decides that the Court was not justified in defaulting Mr. Sykes 
and orders a new trial then the Court need not approach the second issue. 
2) The second issue is posed by the appellant: Was the trial court justified in modifying the 
jury award and thereby reducing the total amount awarded to $76,000 with prejudgment interest of 
$65,693.52 for a total judgment of $141,693.52. The appropriate standard of review is a bit 
problematic. Th- order of the court indicated that the Court was granting a reopening and alteration 
of the verdict. The Court also indicated that it was granting a judgment N.O.V. The first question 
for the Appeals Court is to characterize the nature of what was granted in order to establish a 
standard of review. The normal thrust of a J.N.O.V. is to reverse the jury and to grant judgment to 
the opposing party. Here the issue of liability had been resolved by the Court's default of Mr. Sykes. 
What the Court actually did was to reopen the verdict and reduce the amount of damages. If the 
decision of the trial Court is seen as a J.N.O.V. then the correct standard is the "correctness" standard 
or the trial court had to be correct in its decision. If the decision of the Court is seen as a re-opening 
and modification of the decision then the correct standard is the "abuse of discretion standard". 
Since the reality of the decision was a modification and not a reversal, the better 
characterization appears to be that of a reopening and modification which would mean that the 
appropriate standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, PROVISIONS, ORDINANCES 
RULES OR REGULATIONS 
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Constitution of Utah Article I Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
Constitution of the United States Amendment 5 
... nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The original counter claim was filed by Mr. Hatch et. al. in 1981 (R 80) and amended 
several times since then. The principal claims by Mr. Hatch are: 
1) He was the owner of a piece of land that was about to be sold at trustee sale. 
2) Virginia Flynn had agreed to rescue Mr. Hatch et al. from the sale. 
3) Mr Sykes, Zions Bank and Zions Bank's attorney scared her off by claiming that a lawsuit 
was possible and imminent. 
4) The land was sold at trustee sale. 
5) Mr. Christiansen bought the property on behalf of Mr. Sykes. 
Mr. Sykes (R 36) claimed that 
1) Mr. Hatch had agreed to sell him the property. 
2) Mr. Hatch had signed a contract to that effect. 
3) Mr. Hatch had welched on the deal and was trying to destroy Mr. Sykes claim. 
4) Mr. Sykes was the true owner of the property 
The case has been off and on for years due to the antipathy of the litigants and the fact that 
Mr. Hatch and some of the other plaintiffs have been in and out of bankruptcy several times during 
the period. The three cases were all consolidated since they the same basis and the same issues. The 
root cause of the controversy is a piece of property in Provo which Mr. Sykes and Mr. Hatch both 
claimed to own. The two parties had entered into an agreement for Mr Sykes to buy the South half 
of a piece of property from Mr. Hatch. Then things got sticky. Mr. Sykes claimed that Mr. Hatch had 
agreed to sell him the North half of the property and had signed a document to that effect. Mr. Hatch 
claimed that the document was a fake and that he had never agreed to sell the North half of the 
property to Mr. Sykes. Mr. Hatch also claimed that many evil deeds were perpetrated by Mr. Sykes 
including picking cherries, grazing animals on the land and illegal fertilization with pond sediment. 
He also claims that Mr. Sykes had a duty to water the grass which he didn't fulfill. 
Mr. Hatch claimed that because of Mr. Sykes vigorous pursuit of his claim to the property 
a person willing to loan money on the property (Virginia Flynn) was scared off. Mr. Hatch claims 
that the money would have saved the property from foreclosure by Zions Bank. 
The money was not loaned to Mr. Hatch and therefore the property rights of Mr. Hatch were 
foreclosed and the property was sold to Mr. Christiansen at a sheriffs sale. 
In addition, the water shares to the property were transferred to Mr. Sykes by Provo title at 
the behest of the previous owner (Raggozines). Mr. Hatch has accused Mr. Sykes of improperly 
obtaining these rights and has sued both Provo title and Mr. Sykes for return of those shares. 
Mr. Hatch filed suit against Mr. Sykes, Zions Bank, Mr. Christiansen and Zions Bank's 
lawyers. Mr. Hatch settled his problems with Zions and Zions lawyers for a cash payment. Due to 
the settlement and the affirmation of the sheriffs sale, Mr. Christiansen was dismissed from the suit 
on his motion. On separate motion, all claims against Mr. Sykes were also dismissed after the trial 
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court determined that, with no claim on the property Mr. Hatch no longer had a cause of action 
against Mr. Sykes. Mr. Sykes counterclaims against Mr. Hatch and the Ragozzines were also 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
The dismissals were appealed by all parties except Mr. Christiansen. The Appeals Court 
affirmed the dismissals of claims against Mr. Christiansen and Mr. Hatch but ordered that the trial 
court hold a trial on Mr. Hatch's claims against Mr. Sykes. 
At the pre-trial hearing a decision was reached on the number of witnesses to be called : 
"The plaintiffs and the defendant are limited to six character witnesses. There 
is no limit for the amount of fact witnesses, provided they are named on the final 
witness list. 
The clerk is to advise Judge Mower on January 10,1995, the total number of 
witnesses who will be called to testify at trial. This will assist Judge Mower to 
determine if additional trial time is required." (Minute entry, 9/2/94 [R 1363]). 
After the pre-trial hearing Mr. Primavera asked for and received leave to terminate his participation 
in the case. (R 1440) At this point Mr. Sykes attempted to follow through pro se. Mr. Sykes 
presented a witness list of those who "may be called" (R 1520). Mr. Hatch also amended his witness 
list to add additional witnesses. No objection to Mr. Sykes' witness list was filed by Mr. Hatch. 
On February 1 1995 (5 days prior to trial) the Court sua sponte issued an order sanctioning 
Mr. Sykes for the witness list that he had filed. Incredibly, the sanction was not a limited number of 
witnesses regardless of the list, nor was it a declaration of who would or would not be heard nor even 
money sanctions. The sanction of the Court was a complete default by Mr. Sykes and his 
codetendants (R 1757). The trial Court ordered that Mr. Sykes would not be allowed to appear and 
defend against liability in this action. The trial Court also ruled that a bench trial would be held on 
the issue of damages. Then when Mr. Hatch objected, Judge Mower changed his mind and decided 
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on a jury trial and reduced trial time from 6 to 5 days. When Dwane Sykes showed up for trial on 
February 6 1995 he discovered for the first time that there would be a jury trial instead of a bench 
trial. He was then told that he would have a limited right to cross-examine but could call no 
witnesses. During the period of trial a tremendous latitude was granted to Mr. Hatch including hints 
and prods from the Court on what to include. Mr. Sykes, on the other hand, was severely 
circumscribed in what he was allowed. At one time, in the presence of the jury, Mr. Sykes was told 
to shut up and sit down or go to jail. 
After a 3 day jury trial on February 6-8 1995, predictably, the jury entered a verdict imposing 
liability on all defendants of $509,942 (R 1985). The judgement was entered on April 14 1995. 
Subsequently, Mr. Sykes and his codefendants engaged Mr. Clarke Nielsen as counsel. A 
post trial motion was made by all defendants to "set aside, and alter the judgments and for 
judgement N.O.V. or for a new trial." (R 2068 & R 2071) Subsequently, a settlement was reached 
in which Patricia Sykes and Dennis Sykes were dismissed from the action. The Court denied the 
motion for a new trial and denied the motion to set aside the default verdict but agreed to modify the 
verdict and for J.N.O. V. (R 2355) in which the judgment was reduced to: 
Conversion of Water stock - $ 1,000.00 
Slander of Title and interference with business relationship - $50,000.00 
Prejudgment interest - $65,693.52 
Punitive damages - $25,000.00 
Total judgment - $141,693.52 
Mr. Hatch appealed the reduction in damages done by the Court and Mr. Sykes cross 
appealed his default by the Court and the denial by the Court of his motions to set aside his default 
and for a new trial. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF MR. HATCH 
1. Three days for trial was not sufficient to present his whole case and Dwane Sykes was 
disruptive during the trial. 
2. The jury's water stock conversion award of $6,000 was justified by the evidence. 
3. The jury's trespass award of $30,000 was justified by the evidence. 
4. The jury's slander of title award of $105,000 was justified by the evidence. 
5. The jury's interference in an advantageous business relationship award of $ 10,000 was 
justified by the evidence. 
6. The jury's award of $225,000 in punitive damages was justified by the evidence. 
SUMMARY OF MR. SYKES' ARGUMENTS 
The defaulting of Mr. Sykes was not justified for an over long witness list where he received 
no notice or warning of a default, and where there was no order of the trial Coun regarding the 
number of witnesses allowed on the witness list. There was no prejudice to any party by the length 
of the list and the Court had perfectly rational and easy ways of handling the problem that did not 
require default. 
Mr. Sykes did not receive due process guaranteed by the Utah and U.S. constitutions. When 
there is a question, the Court should err in favor of a trial on the merits. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DEFAULTING MR. SYKES FOR HAVING A WITNESS LIST 
THAT WAS TOO LONG? 
Dwane Sykes was denied a fair trial and due process when the Court entered a default against 
him a mere four days prior to trial without prior notice to him or an opportunity to be heard (R1757). 
Mr. Sykes was defaulted for the submission of a witness list that was longer than the trial 
court wanted. There was no warning, no hearing and no prior notice. Such a draconian solution was 
uncalled for and was an abuse of discretion. It would have been a simple matter for the Trial Court 
to merely limit Mr. Sykes to a certain number of witnesses or allow him to use his time however he 
wished. A limitation of witnesses would have served the interests of a speedy trial without such a 
severe sanction. The case had been pending for 15+ years. Literally years worth of effort and one trip 
already to the Utah Court of Appeals were wiped out in a fit of spleen by the trial court. The 
imposition of a default as a sanction was uncommonly harsh, inequitable and unnecessary. 
Entering default for a disobedient defendant is the most severe of the potential 
sanctions that can be imposed on a non-responding party. 
See Utah Dept. Of Transportation v. Osguthorpe. 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1995). 
But, a real question exists of whether or not Mr. Sykes was actually disobedient. The pre-trial 
order did not limit the number of witnesses that could be listed on the witness list. Indeed, the minute 
entry following the pre-trial hearing the number of witnesses was declared to be unlimited (R 1363). 
The pre-trial order merely limited the number of character witnesses to six. There was also no danger 
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of Mr. Sykes monopolizing the entire trial with his set of witnesses. The trial Judge had already 
decreed that each side would have an equal amount of time (17 hours [R 1443]) in which to present 
his case. 
No party should be defaulted unless the grounds upon which such default is authorized 
are clearly and authoritatively established and are in such clear and certain terms that 
the party to be defaulted can know, without question, that he is subject to default if he 
does not act in a certain fashion. 
See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure. §2681, p.5(1983). 
Mr. Sykes could not possibly have known that he was risking a default by presenting a long 
list of witnesses. There was no warning by the Court. The order for default was a bolt out of the blue. 
Mr. Sykes had not been limited to a finite number of witnesses. Instead the number of witnesses 
would be limited by the time allowed to present the case. 
Any doubt about a default should be resolved in favor of setting it aside. 
See Interstate Excavating Inc. v. Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
The doubts in this case are manifest. There was a far less draconian way for the trial Court 
to handle the question of the number of witnesses. Indeed, the Court really didn't have to handle the 
question at all. The length of the trial was self-limiting as to the number of witnesses. When Mr. 
Sykes' time was up, then his presentation of testimony was through. The Court had no reason on 
its own motion to default Mr. Sykes. Mr. Hatch had not objected to the witness list. There was no 
reason for the Court to care. 
What evil was Mr. Sykes perpetrating with his long witness list? Mr Hatch (the plaintiff) did 
not object. Discovery had been closed long before (R 1443) so there was no prejudice at all to Mr. 
Hatch. The trial Court could simply have used the list as it was intended - as a list of potential 
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witnesses. If Mr. Sykes attempted to call someone who was not on the list then the Trial Court could 
simply not allow it. If Mr. Sykes wanted to burn up all of his time on the first few witnesses on his 
list, that would have been to the advantage of Mr. Hatch and the Trial Court could simply indicate 
to Mr. Sykes that his time was up. 
This case has been pending for 15 years. The case has already been once to the Court of 
Appeals.. The Trial Court was completely unjustified, after the hundreds of documents filed by both 
sides, which were undeniably wild and crazy, when it picked out one document ( which was utterly 
harmless) and then defaulted Mr. Sykes because of it. The Court in its original order of default 
called "Order Regarding Court Availability" (R 1757) states 
"The limits included both time limits and limits as to the total number of witnesses to 
be called." 
The trial Court was laboring under a false impression. The limit on witnesses was only a limit 
on character witnesses. The Court also ordered in the same order that Mr Sykes "would not be 
allowed to appear and defend this action/9 On 2 February 1995 default was entered against Mr. 
Sykes. The Court also ordered that a one day bench trial would be held. Some time later on 2 
February 1995 the trial Court reverses itself and allows Mr. Hatch a jury trial (R 1770) Four days 
later (again with no notice) on the day of the trial the Court reversed itself again and ordered that Mr. 
Sykes could defend himself (prepared or not) only on the damages issue. He was not allowed to call 
witnesses. He was only allowed to cross-examine. 
The Court apparently realized the severity of its sanction, its mistake as to the number of 
witnesses allowed and the irregularity of the trial proceedings because the Court then issue another 
order called "order of default" in which additional reasons are given for the default imposed. 
In its order (R 2059) the Court states: 
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"It was agreed by the parties and confirmed by the later order of the later court order 
that only approximately 22 people could be expected to be called by each side and no 
more than 6 "character witnesses" ". 
While the Court is correct in stating that the number of witnesses was expected to be 22, 
there is no mention that the witness list is to be limited to 22. So, Mr. Sykes did not disobey the pre-
trial order in submitting a witness list longer than 22. Indeed, Mr. Sykes himself indicated his 
understanding that, in all likelihood, not all of these witness would be called by listing the witnesses 
as "may be called". (R 1383, R 1520). 
The Court then adds a new complaint in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable (R 2059): 
"bombarded by a myriad of disparate requests, objections and ex parte motions, some 
mailed, some faxed, but none of them strictly meeting the form requirements set down 
by the rules, all during a time reserved for trial preparations/' 
If the Court in this case intended to default any parties for filing inappropriate, improperly 
formatted, repetitive and frivolous motions, objections and proposed orders then it would have to 
default both parties. There is no realistic mechanism for separating the goose from the gander in this 
case, in terms of sloppy and inappropriate filings. For the trial Court to pick out one of these parties 
for draconian punishment for improper form is pure abuse of discretion. However this after the fact 
justification for the default simply does not square with the truth. The Court stated its real reasons 
for defaulting Mr. Sykes in its order of 2 Febmary 1995 (R 1757). The true reason for the default of 
Mr. Sykes is simply the length of his witness list. There was no other reason. The order (R 2059) 
issued three months after the actual order of default (R1757), which attempted to provide other 
justification for the default, does not represent the true reasons why Mr. Sykes was defaulted. 
Mr. Sykes was entitled to defend on the damages issue even if he were defaulted on the issue 
of liability. Mr. Sykes did not find out until the day of trial that he would be allowed even his limited 
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cross examination. Mr. Sykes had no time at all to prepare. Such a right to cross examine is no right 
at all. 
When Defendants have entered their appearance and participate in pretrial matters, 
they are entitled to notice and an opportunity to appear, cross-examine witnesses, and 
present evidence on the damage issues even after their default. 
See Rodriguez v. Conant. 737 P.2d 527, 105 N.M. 746 (1987). 
Mr. Sykes was not given an opportunity to present his side of the case. He was given only 
a limited opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Hatch's witnesses. He was not allowed to call any of this 
own. 
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue of damages once the Defendant's default 
has been entered. 
See Amiga Mutual Insurance Co, v, fichettler, 768 P.2d 956 (Utah App. 1989). 
Upon entry of the Defendant's default, Howard Hatch was not entitled to a jury trial on the 
damages under Rule 55, Utah R. Civ. P. And the Court should not have allowed a jury trial without 
notice to Mr. Sykes. 
First there was to be a jury trial. Then, there was not. Then, there was again. No notice was 
given to Mr. Sykes so that he could prepare for a jury or for the Court. Indeed, Mr. Sykes was not 
even aware of whether or not he would be able to ask questions or present any case at all until the 
day of the trial. Even the best of trial attorneys would be hard pressed to simply jump into trial with 
no preparation. Mr. Sykes could not have done any kind of reasonable job in defending himself. In 
remitting the case for trial on the merits after the trial court had stricken a party's pleadings and 
granted default judgment to the other party for failure to appear at a deposition or provide the 
requested documents the Utah Supreme Court states: 
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"The language of the rule as presently worded is permissive, rather than mandatory, 
wherein it states: that the court may make such orders ... as are just and ... **may take 
any action..." etc. This grants the court discretionary authority to impose the sanctions 
mentioned. It is true that where the authority to perform a proposed action rests within 
the discretion of the court we must allow considerable latitude in which he may exercise 
his judgment. But this does not mean that the court has unrestrained power to act in 
an arbitrary manner. Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law is the principle that 
reason and justice shall prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one 
person; and that this applies to all men in every status: to courts and judges, as well as 
autocrats or bureaucrats. The meaning of the term "discretion" itself imports that the 
action should be taken within reason and good conscience in the interest of protecting 
the rights of both parties and serving the ends of justice. It has always been the policy 
of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on 
the merits of a controversy. " 
See Carmen v. Slavens 546 P.2d 601, 603 ( Utah 1976). 
Mr. Sykes is entitled to a trial on the merits. 
MR. SYKES WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
"The Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7 provides: No person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The Court has explained the due 
process guarantee as follows: 
Neither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person a constitutional 
right or deprive such person of a vested interest in property without any 
opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due 
process of law. Many attempts have been made to further define adue process" 
but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day n court - that 
is each party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the 
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his 
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record just made. " 
Thus the essential requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded his "day 
in court." It has always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of 
permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of the controversy." 
See Celebrity Club inc. V. Utah Liquor Control Commission 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 
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1982). 
Mr. Sykes was deprived of his "day in court" because his witness list was too long. He was 
given no notice. He was given no warning. He was given no hearing. Mr. Sykes did not receive the 
due process guaranteed by the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. 
II. WAS THE REOPENING OF THE CASE AND 
REDUCTION OF DAMAGES JUSTIFIED? 
LENGTH OF TRIAL IS COMPLAINED OF TO NO PURPOSE 
Mr. Hatch begins his argument with a lengthy complaint about having only three days of trial 
to establish his damages. He also complains about the behavior of Mr. Sykes during the trial. 
Curiously, Mr, Hatch then states: 
"Mr Hatch does not necessarily fault the Court for the limited time allotted for him to 
put on his case, but he does fault Dwane Sykes for his many unjustified intrusions and 
lengthy and unnecessary time spent on cross examination" 
(See Brief of Appellant pg 13) This statement negates the entire puipose of such a discussion. I am 
unaware of any case that has been reversed due to error on the part of the opposing party. Mr. Hatch 
offers no such precedent. I must assume that Mr. Hatch merely was looking for a forum to vent his 
spleen or intending to provide filler for his brief, since no relief is requested or trial Court error 
alleged, nor was this issue raised in the Appellant's docketing statement. 
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WATER STOCK CONVERSION 
Mr. Hatch states that his opinion on what the water stock might have been worth is sufficient 
evidence for the jury to award four to six times that much. Mr. Hatch admits that the only evidence 
offered (Mr. Hatch's opinion) sets the value of the stock at $1000-$1500 (R-3343). The jury, without 
a shred of additional evidence, then finds the value of the water stock to be $6,000 (R 1985). Mr. 
Hatch argues that the jury lumped punitive damages together with compensatory damages to arrive 
at the $6,000 figure. Aside from the fact that Mr. Hatch has absolutely no evidence to support that 
assumption, the jury made a separate finding of punitive damages. If Mr. Hatch is correct in his pure 
speculation on the actions of the jury in lumping together punitive and compensatory damages then 
he simply adds another reason for J.N.O.V. since the jury obviously did not understand their 
instructions and mixed various damages together in an improper manner. 
The simple fact is that the only available evidence on the value of the water stock is Mr. 
Hatch's unqualified and self serving opinion of $1000-$ 1500. Had Mr. Hatch properly presented 
his case he would have produced documentary evidence and/or expert (or at least knowledgeable) 
testimony on the actual value of the water stock. The jury was without justification in snatching 
another value out of the air($6,000), and Judge Mower was correct in bringing the verdict ($ 1,000) 
back into line with the testimony. 
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TRESPASS 
This is perhaps the most interesting of all the claims for damages because it is the most 
nebulous. Mr. Hatch Asserts that: Mr. Sykes trespassed on his property and put some horses on it, 
collected money for rent, picked pie cherries, posted a sign saying no trespassing and took down 
some signs which were offering to sell the property. 
HORSES 
The evidence offered as to the horses placed on the property was sketchy at best. Mr. 
Christiansen, who actually owned the property through the majority of the time of the pendency of 
this case has stated that he had grazed horses on the property. No evidence has been offered 
indicating the time frame of the grazing or who owned the property when the horses were grazed. 
No evidence was offered as to how many horses were placed on the property or when or how long. 
Nor was any evidence offered as to what damage, if any, that the horses did. There is no way for the 
Court to judge what damage if any was done by horses, or when or for how long. Indeed, it can be 
considered that horses on a piece of property actually could improve the property by keeping weeds 
down, demonstrating that the property was "horse property", adding natural fertilizer to the land and 
creating a peaceful bucolic scene. The presence of horses on the property can be properly argued 
as a mitigating circumstance which actually added value to the property. There is no evidence to the 
contrary. 
RENT 
It was stated in testimony that Mr. Sykes was renting out the property as pasture and collected 
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rent on it. Again, there are the same question: When, how many, how long, how much etc. A bald 
statement that Mr. Sykes rented the pasture out provides no guidance whatsoever in establishing 
what damage, if any, was caused. The pasture might have been rented out once for a church social 
with the charge being $.10. The pasture might have been rented out to a mining company to mine 
gold at a cost of $10,000/hr . There is no evidence. The value picked by the jury ($3().0()0) is 
completely unsubstantiated. 
PIE CHERRIES 
Mr. Sykes also is alleged to have picked pie cherries. Here again there is little or nothing on 
which to base an award. How many cherries - Two, two hundred, two million9 When were the 
cherries picked. What state were they in. Did Mr. Hatch intend to pick the cherries9 Had he ever in 
the past picked the cherries? What was the market value of cherries at the time9 All of these 
questions remain unanswered. The evidence in the case offers nothing except a bald assertion that 
some pie cherries were picked by Mr. Sykes. The evidence is insufficient to show any loss at all 
much less ($30,000). 
FOR SALE SIGNS 
Mr. Hatch also alleges that Mr. Sykes took out some for sale signs. There is no allegation that 
this caused any damages to the property itself. However, one might reasonably assume that this 
action deprived Mr. Hatch of a potential buyer for the property. In view of the subsequent loss of the 
property to foreclosure this action of Mr. Sykes could be considered significant. But the loss of the 
property (in terms of damages) is compensated in the slander of title and interference with 
advantageous business relationship claims). Were the Court to award a separate amount for this 
action there would be a duplication or award for the same damage. The valuation of what the loss 
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of the property cost Mr. Hatch is done subsequently. 
There was insufficient evidence to produce any realistic valuation of damages. The jury was 
simply left to pick a number out of the air; which they did. The jury had absolutely no basis for 
determining an award for trespass and the Court correctly reduced that award to zero. 
SLANDER OF TITLE AND INTERFERENCE WITH AN 
ADVANTAGEOUS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
The damages for interference with an advantageous business relationship and the damages 
for the slander of title claim are identical. The claimed advantageous relationship was an attempt to 
secure a mortgage on the property (which Mr. Hatch subsequently lost to foreclosure). There was 
no independent loss from the falling apart of the mortgage arrangement that is not encompassed by 
the loss of the property. Likewise the only loss due to the claim of slander of title was the loss of the 
property to foreclosure. So separate awards for these two claims would be a double recovery. The 
proper value of this claim is the value of the property that was lost. 
It is undisputed that the property was valued at $30,000 to $35,000 per acre. The property 
was 3 acres in size given a total maximum valuation of $105,000. There were however, two 
outstanding undisputed encumbrances on the property. There was a first mortgage of $25,000 to 
Zion's bank and $30,000 to the University Avenue Development Association. That leaves a net 
equity of $50,000. That is the value of what was lost by Mr. Hatch. Were he to sell at the time that 
he lost the property his return would have been $50,000 not $105,000. 
The jury ignored the evidence of the two mortgages to reach their verdict of 105,000 . The 
Court, in its Judgment J.N.O.V., simply applied the undisputed evidence which had been presented 
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to arrive at the figure of $50,000. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Mr. Hatch argues that $75,000 in punitive damages is reasonable and supported by the 
evidence. Punitive damages are derivative damages. They can be awarded only in the presence of 
actual damages. The Court stated that since the actually damages were considerably reduced from 
what the jury awarded and considering the financial circumstance of the Mr. Sykes that the jury 
award of $75,000 was excessive. Accordingly the Court awarded $25,000 to more closely conform 
to Mr. Sykes' financial state and to the actual damages awarded. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Mr. Hatch urges that under the Real Estate Contract signed for the sale of the North half of 
the property that he is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. He makes this argument based on his 
recovery of $1,000 for loss of his water stock. Mr. Hatch is trying to pull the proverbial camel 
through the eye of a needle. Mr. Hatch has claimed damages in excess of Vi million dollars from the 
beginning of the suit. The issue between the parties was never over the water rights. If such had been 
the case then the issue could have been settled in small claims court or even a settlement of the issue 
would have long since occurred. The issue between the parties was over the loss of the property and 
the major league claims that Mr. Hatch was making for damages. Mr. Sykes has spent his health, his 
sanity, his family and thousands of dollars on legal fees to fight this case. If he could have settled it 
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for the cost of the water rights 15 years ago then there is no doubt that the case would have ended 
long ago. 
The clause in the Real Estate Contract referring to legal fees is irrelevant to this case. The 
property at issue here is not the property that is the subject of the Real Estate Contract. This cause 
of action dealt only tangentially with the water rights issue. The real issue here was the ownership 
of the North Vi of the property and whether Mr. Sykes was justified in his pursuit of it. 
REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF DAMAGES 
Cleared of all of the drivel this is the basic event which led to the lawsuit. Mr. Hatch lost his 
property and he claims that Mr. Sykes caused it. It is uncontested that Mr. Hatch had $5().0(X) equity 
in the property. Mr. Hatch also claims that Mr. Sykes is responsible for the loss of water stock valued 
(in his own opinion) at $1,000 - $1,500. Therefore, Mr. Hatch lost at most $51,500. The Court 
actually awarded $51,000. The trial Court also awarded $25,000 in punitive damages and $65,693.52 
in pre-judgment interest. Making a total verdict of $141,693.52. Contrast that award with the jury\s 
verdict of over $500,000 after adding in pre-judgment interest. The verdict of the jury is far beyond 
any reasonable calculation of damages. One half million dollars for the actual loss of $50,000 can 
not be supported by the facts of this case. The judge was correct to reopen the verdict of the jury. 
The measure of damages given by the court as a result of the motion is the only reasonable course 
the Trial Court could take given the instant facts and evidence offered. 
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MR. HATCH WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
The evidence is insufficient to support any damages awarded, in that Howard Hatch had 
conveyed his interest in the property by Special Warrantee Deed to the University Avenue 
Development Associates [hereinafter U.A.D.A.] on August 28, 1981 and stated that U.A.D.A is was 
the real party in interest. U.A.D.A. was a party to the suit prior to be dismissed by this Court when 
it failed to appeal the dismissal of the case (R 1132) 
Mr. Hatch had passed his interest in the disputed property to U.A.D.A. prior to the time that 
any of the alleged acts of Mr. Sykes occurred. In his warrantee deed Howard Hatch conveyed all of 
his right and title to the property to U.A.D.A. (R 1910 Exhibits 82 -85). The deed was not recorded 
till later but such a late recording does not negate the transfer of title that occurred. 
Although the deed wasn't recorded until later, the transfer of title was operative 
between the parties at the time of delivery. 
See Crowther v. Mower. 876 P.2d 876 (Utah App. 1994). 
The evidence shows unequivocally that Mr. Hatch was not damaged by any actions of Mr. 
Sykes. Mr. Hatch was not the owner of the property in question during any of the actions of Mr. 
Sykes. He was only a partner in U.A.D.A. which was a limited partnership. Any recovery from Mr. 
Sykes would have to be in favor of U.A.D.A.. Earlier in the litigation, U.A.D.A. was a party to this 
action. However, U.A.D.A. failed to appeal an earlier dismissal of the action and so was dismissed 
by this Court. Therefore, no damages should have been granted at all against Mr. Sykes. 
When property is held by a partnership then the partnership is the real party in 
interest and no individual partner has a separate cognizable interest. 
See Canlener v. United Savings Nat'1 Rank. 317 Or 506, 857 P.2d 830 (1993). 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sykes actually wants a chance to present his case and feels that the default imposed on 
him by the Court only a few days before trial was unwarranted, arbitrary and capricious. There were 
simply better ways to handle a long witness list than to default the party that presented it. Mr. Sykes 
is entitled to his "day in court" as much as Mr. Hatch. Mr. Sykes was not given the due process 
required by law. Mr. Sykes asks the Court to overturn the verdict of the trial Court and remit the case 
for a trial on the merits. 
Mr. Hatch was not even the real party in interest in this action. The evidence unequivocally 
shows that Mr. Hatch had transferred his interest to U.A.D.A. prior to the events complained of here. 
Mr. Hatch is not entitled to a double recovery on his property (one from U.A.D.A. and one from Mr. 
Sykes). 
Mr. Sykes also reasons that a V2 million dollar award by the jury for the loss of equity of 
$50,000 is ludicrous. The only reasonable valuation of the property was done by a professional 
appraiser at $105,000. Mr. Hatch had undisputed mortgages on the property of $55,000. The only 
evidence offered for the value of the water stock was $1000-$ 1500. The total loss of Mr. Hatch was 
$51,000. Adding punitive damages of $25,000 and pre-judgment interest the total award given by 
the Court was $141,693.52. The Trial Court took the next best action to actually granting Mr. Sykes 
his day in Court. The Trial Court reduced the jury award to what could possibly be supported by the 
evidence. If Mr. Sykes is not granted a new trial then he asks the Court to affirm the decision by the 
trial court. 
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